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ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores some of the developing strategies designed to 
tackle the supply side of transnational corruption through the “Art of 
Persuasion” i.e. how to “persuade” commercial organisations, no matter 
how powerful, to commit to good governance and integrity in their 
business. In doing so, it uses Alstom SA (hereinafter Alstom) as a case 
study. The article is divided into three parts. Part 1 explores some of 
“persuasive” techniques designed to combat the bribery of foreign public 
officials and to enhance corporate good governance and integrity. Part 2 
explores some of the lessons and challenges from the Alstom case whilst 
Part 3 contains a Conclusion which re-visits the “Art of Persuasion”. 
 
KEY WORDS: Corruption; Bribery of Foreign Public Officials; ‘Art of 
Persuasion’; Debarment; Alstom; Bribery Act 2010; Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act; World Bank procurement guidelines.  
 
THE CHALLENGE 
 
Combating corruption and enhancing good governance are neither the 
sole preserve of the public sector nor simply national issues. Today the 
private sector wields immense economic power and political influence 
both nationally and internationally and it is in those sectors where the 
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State and the private sector interact and intersect that are often 
characterised by corrupt practices.1  
This is particularly the case in the energy and related sectors. For 
example, some 3.5 billion people live in countries rich in oil, gas or 
minerals. As the World Bank has emphasised, “with good governance and 
transparent management, the revenues from extractive industries can have 
a transformational impact on reducing poverty and boosting shared 
prosperity, while respecting community needs and the environment”.2 Oil 
and gas producers also pay governments huge sums for contracts as well 
as licence fees and taxes. Yet this wealth is often not translated into social 
and economic development in many of the resource-rich States for the 
considerable revenues that these produce are often the root cause of both 
grand corruption and the bribery of foreign public officials by 
transnational corporations.3 As the Commission for Africa has put it:  
 
“It is not only the politicians and public officials who create the 
problem: it is also the corporations, bankers, the lawyers and the 
accountants, and the engineers working on public contracts”.4 
 
Given this reality, in seeking to address bribery on the supply side, 
new strategies are required. As Slapper puts it: 
 
“This is a world in which the power and reach of transnational 
corporations is something that requires the development of a 
                                                     
1 In this context, the “private sector” is defined as “the sector of a national 
economy under private ownership in which the allocation of productive resources 
is controlled by market forces, rather than public authorities and other sectors of 
the economy not under the public sector or government”, Article 1, African 
Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption.  
2 According to the World Bank, non-renewable mineral resources play a 
dominant role in 81 countries, which collectively account for a quarter of world 
GDP, half of the world’s population, and nearly 70% of those in extreme poverty. 
Africa is home to about 30% of the world’s mineral reserves, 10% of the world’s 
oil, and 8% of the world’s natural gas: see 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/overview#1> accessed 
1 July 2016. 
3 Revenue Watch Institute/Transparency International, Promoting Revenue 
Transparency: 2011 Report on Oil and Gas Companies (2011) 5. 
4 Commission for Africa, Our Common Interest (Commission for Africa 2005) 
150.  
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jurisprudence different from that which emerged in an earlier 
era...”5 
This article explores some of the developing strategies designed to 
tackle the supply side of transnational corruption through the “Art of 
Persuasion” i.e. how to “persuade” commercial organisations, no matter 
how powerful, to commit to good governance and integrity in their 
business.6 In doing so, it uses Alstom SA (hereinafter Alstom) as a case 
study. Alstom is headquartered in France and is involved in the 
engineering and, until recently, the energy sector.7 It operates via a series 
of subsidiaries through which it bids to secure contracts on projects 
around the world, some of which are funded by the World Bank and other 
international financial institutions. It has some 110,000 employees in over 
seventy countries.8   
The article is divided into three parts. Part 1 explores some of 
“persuasive” techniques designed to combat the bribery of foreign public 
officials and to enhance corporate good governance and integrity. Part 2 
explores some of the lessons and challenges from the Alstom case whilst 
Part 3 contains a Conclusion which re-visits the “Art of Persuasion”. 
 
PART 1: THE “ART OF PERSUASION” 
 
Given their economic and political muscle, “persuading” commercial 
organisations, including even the most powerful transnational corporate 
entities (and however reluctantly), to act with integrity and to implement 
effective anti-bribery measures in their business activities is potentially 
extremely challenging.9  
                                                     
5 Gary Slapper, “Violent Corporate Crime, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Human Rights” in Aurora Voiculescu and Helen Yanacopulos (eds), The 
Business of Human Rights: An Evolving Agenda for Corporate Responsibility 
(Zed Books 2010) 81. 
6 The term “commercial organisations” is used in the UK Bribery Act 2010 with 
reference to foreign bribery offences: see s 7(5)(c). In general, in this article it 
covers corporate entities and partnerships which carry on a trade, business or 
profession.  
7 As noted below, the proposed sale of its energy business to GE was put in 
jeopardy due to Alstom’s involvement in a series of global bribery scandals.  
8 The information is drawn from the Statement of Facts contained in Alstom’s 
Plea Agreement with the US Department of Justice in 2014: see United States v 
Alstom SA Case 3:14-cr-00246-JBA.   
9 KPMG, Anti-Bribery and Corruption: Rising to the Challenge in the Age of 
Globalization (KPMG 2015) 7. 
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In practice the challenge is to “persuade” such entities, whether they 
want to or not, to  
 
i. Take effective steps to prevent the bribery of foreign public 
officials in their business activities; and  
ii. Reveal everything about any past involvement in such bribery. 
 
There are a series of persuasive strategies that suggest that some 
progress can be, and is being, made in this regard. In essence these 
strategies consist of:   
 
A. Moral persuasion: Persuading commercial organisations to develop 
and implement effective internal ethics and compliance mechanisms; 
B. Gentle persuasion: Persuading commercial organisations to adhere to 
international standards on corporate good governance and integrity;  
C. Forceful persuasion: Prosecuting those commercial organisations and 
their officials for their involvement in foreign bribery; 
D. Persuasive threats: Encouraging commercial organisations to self-
report their wrongdoing backed up by threats if this is not done.10  
 
A. Moral Persuasion: Persuading commercial organisations to develop 
and implement internal ethics and compliance mechanisms 
 
Commercial organisations are increasingly concerned about their 
potential for exposure to reputational and litigation risks for a failure to 
prevent bribery within their global operations. In practice many have 
developed their own a code of ethics and anti-bribery programmes.11 This 
finds support in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC) which highlights the importance of:  
 
“Promoting the development of standards and procedures designed 
to safeguard the integrity of relevant private entities, including 
codes of conduct for the correct, honourable and proper 
                                                     
10 For a general discussion see John Hatchard, Combating Corruption: Legal 
Approaches to Supporting Good Governance and Integrity in Africa (Edward 
Elgar, 2014) 335-345. 
11 In this context a “Programme” represents “the enterprise’s anti-bribery efforts 
including values, code of conduct, detailed policies and procedures, risk 
management, internal and external communication, training and guidance, 
internal controls, oversight, monitoring and assurance”: Transparency 
International, Business Principles for Countering Bribery  (2013) Principle 2.   
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performance of the activities of business … and for the promotion 
of good commercial practices among businesses and in the 
contractual relations of businesses with the State”.12 
 
The publication of such codes and programmes highlights a public 
commitment on the part of the commercial organisation to corporate good 
governance. A good example is provided by Alstom itself:  
 
“Our Code of Ethics is essential and all employees, in their day-to-
day work, need to share the same clear values and observe the 
same rules of personal and collective conduct that define Alstom 
as an ethical company”.13   
 
In practice, the value of such codes and programmes is questionable 
and, as Transparency International (TI) has observed: 
 
“[a]t their worst, corporate responsibility programmes may be 
mere window-dressing exercises. At their best, these initiatives 
represent genuine attempts by companies working with 
stakeholders to address the great environmental, social and ethical 
challenges of our times”.14 
 
As discussed below, the corporate codes of ethics and compliance 
programmes are reinforced by “gentle persuasion” initiatives. 
 
B. Gentle Persuasion: Persuading commercial organisations to adhere 
to international standards on corporate good governance and integrity 
 
There are now an impressive range of global standard-setting 
initiatives aimed at enhancing integrity and combating corruption in the 
                                                     
12 Art 12(2)(b). Article 12(1) requires each State Party “in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of its legal system” to prevent corruption involving the 
private sector [and] enhance accounting and auditing standards. 
13 The Alstom Code of Ethics is available at 
<https://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/cop_2015/211831/origin
al/AlstomCodeEthics_GB_2014_interactif_Oct14.pdf?1447744097> accessed 1 
July 2016. 
14 Transparency International, Corporate Responsibility & Anti-Corruption: the 
Missing Link? (TI Working Paper 01/2010) 1. 
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private sector.15 Perhaps the best known is the United Nations Global 
Compact (UNGC) which is widely regarded as the world’s largest 
corporate responsibility initiative. The UNGC consists of a set of 
voluntary norms consisting of ten Principles (the UNGC Principles). The 
10th Principle, which was adopted in 2004, simply states:  
 
“Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, 
including extortion and bribery”. 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Transparency 
International Business Principles for Countering Bribery (the Business 
Principles) contain similar principles.16 
The Business Principles provide a blueprint for the development of 
effective corporate good governance and integrity. They are based on a 
Board commitment to the fundamental values of integrity, transparency, 
and accountability and the principle that “[e]nterprises should aim to 
create and maintain a trust-based and inclusive internal culture in which 
bribery is not tolerated”.17 There is also a commitment by the “enterprise” 
to the implementation of a “Programme” to counter bribery. Given the 
realities of international business, the Business Principles also require the 
enterprise to extend its Programme to its subsidiaries and “use its 
influence to encourage an equivalent Programme in other business entities 
in which it has a significant investment or with which it has significant 
business relationships”.18 Further it should take appropriate action in 
respect of joint ventures and consortia, contractors and suppliers and 
agents and representatives.19  
Whilst these initiatives comprise recommendations, the UNGC 
involves some monitoring.  Over 12,000 “business participants” in 170 
countries have registered with the UNGC, with each making a 
                                                     
15 For a detailed account of these initiatives, see Colin Nicholls, Tim Daniel, Alan 
Bacarese, James Maton and John Hatchard, Corruption and Misuse of Public 
Office (3rd edn, OUP 2017) paras 13.04-13.58. 
16 Principle 2 states that “The enterprise shall prohibit bribery in any form 
whether direct or indirect”. The working definition of “bribery” adopted for the 
purposes of the Business Principles is: “The offering, promising, giving, 
accepting or soliciting of an advantage as an inducement for an action which is 
illegal or a breach of trust” 4.  
17 Principle 2. 
18 Para 5.2.1. 
19 Alstom’s use of subsidiaries and agents/consultants through which to pay 
bribes to foreign public officials is discussed below. 
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commitment to integrate the Principles into their strategies and operations. 
All are required to produce an annual Communication on Progress (CoP) 
which is a public self-assessment on progress made in implementing the 
UNGC Principles, and in supporting broad UN development goals.  
Alstom joined the UNGC in 2008 and since 2011 has been categorised 
as an “active” member. Its annual CoP reports highlight its commitment to 
the UNGC Principles. For example, in 2012 it emphasised the fact that 
“Infringing laws, acting without business ethics and personal integrity 
inhibits innovation, increases costs, [and] impairs quality”. Further, it 
announced that it had a Code of Ethics which was available in numerous 
languages and that it had also developed a training regime on ethics for its 
employees.20 Similarly, in its 2015 CoP report, the company highlighted 
its commitment to business ethics noting that the Alstom Integrity 
Programme was certified in 2011 and 2014 by ETHIC International and 
that as a member of the UNGC it was involved in initiatives and working 
groups on preventing corruption.21    
On the face of it, such public affirmations suggest that the standard 
setting initiatives can influence the development of a “good governance” 
culture within commercial organisations. However to what extent this 
occurs in practice is questionable and this is highlighted in the case of 
Alstom (and its subsidiaries) which, as discussed below, has a lengthy 
record of bribe-paying on a global scale.      
 
C. Forceful Persuasion: Prosecuting those commercial organisations 
and their senior officials involved in foreign bribery  
 
The Commission for Africa has rightly demanded that:  
 
“... rich nations should put in place a series of measures to ... deter 
their own companies from paying bribes in the first place. After all 
as the former Zairean dictator President Mobutu Sese Seko once 
reputedly said: ‘It takes two to be corrupt – the corrupted and the 
corrupter’. And he should know”.22  
 
1. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
 
                                                     
20 See Alstom, Ethics and Compliance: Overall Risk Assessment (2012) 4.  
21 Alstom, Activity and Sustainable Development Report 2014-2015 at 4. The 
report comprises part of the 2015 Alstom CoP report. 
22 Commission for Africa, (n 4) 31. 
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The key initiative here is the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention). This came into force on 15 
February 1999 and is concerned wholly with “active corruption” i.e. 
bribery on the supply side. Its significance is emphasised by the fact that 
the 41 parties to the Convention are involved in some two-thirds of world 
exports and almost 90 per cent of total foreign direct investment 
outflows.23 
Article 1(1) states that:  
 
“Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person 
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or 
other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a 
foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order 
that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the 
performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business 
or other improper advantage in the conduct of international 
business”.  
 
For the purposes of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, a foreign 
public official means “any person holding a legislative, administrative or 
judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any 
person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a 
public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public 
international organization”.24  
In view of the economic interests and/or political pressure that might 
affect prosecutions, Article 5 makes it clear that investigations and 
prosecutions:  
 
“… shall not be influenced by considerations of national economic 
interest, the potential effect upon relations with another state or the 
identity of the national or legal person involved”.  
 
Article 5 is supported by paragraph 6 of the Annex to the 1997 
Revised Recommendations of the OECD Ministerial Council which 
                                                     
23 These comprise the thirty-five OECD member states plus Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Colombia, Russian Federation and South Africa. 
24 Art 1(4)(a). 
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stresses that “public prosecutors should exercise their discretion 
independently, based on professional motives”.25  
 
 
2. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in practice 
 
The United States (US) through its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
1977 and the United Kingdom (UK) through its Bribery Act 2010 are both 
actively implementing their Convention obligations.  
 
i) The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act  
 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) makes it unlawful for US 
persons to make a corrupt payment to a foreign public official for the 
purpose of obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing 
business to, any person.26 What makes the FCPA so powerful is that these 
provisions also apply to issuers of securities listed and traded on a US 
exchange.27 In addition, the Act requires companies to keep accurate 
books and records and to establish and maintain adequate internal 
controls. Failure to do so constitutes a criminal offence. Until August 
2014, Alstom’s shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Accordingly it was an “issuer” for the purposes of the FCPA.28 
As discussed below, in practice, the significant penalties that can be 
imposed by a court under the FCPA means that commercial organisations 
are willing to reach a settlement with the two enforcement agencies, the 
Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), to resolve foreign bribery case(s). Of particular significance here is 
                                                     
25 Commentary 27 to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention makes it clear that the 
decision must not be subject to improper influence by concerns of a political 
nature. Prosecutorial discretion may include the application of a public interest 
test but this is to be determined by the prosecutor. 
26 Curiously, the word “bribe” does not appear in the Act itself. 
27 See generally Department of Justice FCPA: A Resource Guide to the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (DoJ 2015) 
<https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf> accessed 1 September 2016.  
28 For a full discussion on the FCPA see Colin Nicholls et al, Corruption and 
Misuse of Public Office (n 15) ch 20. For a useful discussion on FCPA 
enforcement cases involving energy issues in Africa see Sarah Banco et al, “Anti-
Corruption Initiatives in Africa” in Marc Hammerson and John C LaMaster (eds), 
Oil and Gas in Africa: A Legal and Commercial Analysis of the Upstream 
Industry (Globe Law and Business 2015) 157-163. 
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that the wide jurisdictional provisions of the FCPA means that the DoJ 
frequently takes on the role of a “global enforcer”. Indeed, in terms of 
fines, eight out of the top ten FCPA enforcement cases have been imposed 
on companies headquartered outside the US. As discussed below, one of 
those cases involved a DoJ investigation into allegations that Alstom had 
paid bribes to obtain business on a global scale. As a result, the company 
currently has the dubious distinction of being subjected to the highest fine 
ever imposed for a breach of the FCPA provisions. One of the reasons for 
the DoJ commencing the investigation was that there was no investigation 
into Alstom’s affairs being undertaken by France, where the company has 
its headquarters. 
 
ii) The Bribery Act 2010 
 
The UK was subjected to significant and prolonged criticism by both 
the OECD Working Group on Bribery and non-governmental 
organisations following the decision by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) 
not to prosecute BAe in respect of the Al Yamamah bribery case.29 
However since 2012 a policy change has seen the SFO bringing a series of 
foreign bribery prosecutions against both commercial organisations and 
individuals. To date these have largely been brought under the pre-2010 
bribery laws as the Bribery Act 2010 is not retrospective. As discussed 
below, several Alstom subsidiaries and senior officials are the subject of 
ongoing criminal proceedings in the UK. 
Section 6 of the Bribery Act 2010 specifically prohibits the bribery of 
a foreign public official and is based of Article 1 of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention. Significantly, section 7 introduces a strict liability of 
offence of “failing to prevent corruption”. This provides: 
 
(1) A relevant commercial organisation (‘C’) is guilty of an offence 
under this section if a person (‘A’) associated with C bribes another 
person intending— 
(a) to obtain or retain business for C; or 
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for 
C.30 
                                                     
29 For a full account see Colin Nicholls, Tim Daniel, Alan Bacarese and John 
Hatchard, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office (2nd edn, OUP 2011) paras 
7.208-7.220. 
30 The first conviction under section 7 came in December 2015 when the Sweett 
Group PLC pleaded guilty to a charge of failing to prevent an act of bribery 
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The significance of the development of effective corporate codes of 
conduct and compliance programmes is highlighted in section 7(2): 
 
(2) But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place adequate 
procedures designed to prevent persons associated with C from 
undertaking such conduct. 
In this context, the Ministry of Justice has published Guidance in the 
form of six Principles as to what constitute “adequate procedures”31 with 
one being that: 
 
“The commercial organisation seeks to ensure that its bribery 
prevention policies and procedures are embedded and understood 
throughout the organisation through internal and external 
communication, including training that is proportionate to the risks 
it faces”.32    
 
The Bribery Act also has a wide jurisdictional reach. It applies to UK 
companies and UK registered partnerships as well as overseas entities 
which carry on a business or part of a business in the UK. As Nicholls 
points out, the result is that “an overseas company can be prosecuted for 
failing to prevent bribery by a person performing services on its behalf 
irrespective of the nationality of the person offering the bribe, and even 
though the bribery is in relation to non-UK businesses and the bribery is 
committed entirely outside the UK”.33  
 
iii) Other Parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
 
Regrettably, the political will to prosecute foreign bribery cases is 
scarcely reflected elsewhere. All Parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention have put in place domestic laws that criminalise the bribery of 
foreign public officials. However, the continuing low number of 
prosecutions in the majority of Parties raises concerns over the 
                                                                                                                        
intended to secure and retain a contract in the United Arab Emirates: see SFO 
Press Release, 19 February 2016 and see n 54 below. 
31 Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act: Guidance about Procedures which 
Commercial Organisations can put in Place to Prevent Persons associated with 
them from Bribing (2011). This was published as required by section 9 of the 
Bribery Act 2010. For a full analysis see Nicholls et al, (n 15) paras 4.56-4.75. 
32 Principle 5. 
33 Nicholls et al, (n 15) para 3.18. 
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effectiveness of the Convention itself. This is reflected in the TI Annual 
Progress Report on the Implementation of the Convention 2015 which 
found that there was “Active enforcement” in only four convention 
countries.34  
France, (where Alstom has its headquarters, it must be remembered), 
was categorised by TI in its 2014 report Exporting Corruption as having 
“Limited enforcement”. This was a somewhat generous classification 
given that between 2011 and 2014 there were no major cases concluded 
which led to the imposition of sanctions.35 The TI report also highlights 
the fact that France continues to disregard the Article 5 provision and cites 
concerns over the perceived lack of independence of prosecutors from the 
Ministry of Justice.36 Certainly, it appears that neither Alstom nor any of 
its senior officials have been subject to any prosecution in France.37 
Saenz’s view seems to encapsulate the present position: 
 
“France’s … general unwillingness to convict its own firms of 
foreign bribery offers little promise for change in the near 
future”.38 
 
Continuing pressure on all Parties for the use of forceful persuasion is 
highlighted in the OECD Ministerial Declaration of March 2016. Here 
“Ministers and Representative of the Parties to the OECD Convention” 
reaffirmed their commitment to the “robust enforcement of the laws 
implementing the foreign bribery offence by all Parties” and reiterated 
their commitment to Article 5.39 It remains to be seen whether this has any 
real impact on the political will on the part of all Parties to the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention to prosecute foreign bribery cases. Given this 
                                                     
34 These are Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
35 Transparency International, Exporting Corruption: Progress Report 2014: 
Assessing enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Foreign Bribery 
(2014) 2. 
36 Ibid, 9. 
37 Between 1999 and 2013, no “legal person” was either acquitted or sanctioned 
in France: see OECD Working Group on Bribery, Annual Report 2014, 18. But 
see n 89 below for a recent development. 
38 Sara C Saenz, “Explaining International Variance in Foreign Bribery 
Prosecutions: A Comparative Case Study” (2015) 26 Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law 271, 285. This reinforces the importance of the 
DoJ decision to bring FCPA enforcement action against Alstom.  
39 OECD Anti-Bribery Ministerial Meeting, Ministerial Declaration “The OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention and its Role in the Global Fight against Corruption”, 16 
March 2016, para I.1. 
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reality, the development of persuasive threats is a necessary complement 
to forceful persuasion. 
 
D. Persuasive Threats: Encouraging commercial organisations to self-
report their wrongdoing 
 
Investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery cases is often extremely 
challenging, especially given the fact that, on the face of it, there is little 
or no incentive for those involved to reveal the corrupt bargain.  
Whilst criticism of the failure by many Parties to the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention to prosecute foreign bribery cases effectively is 
justified, in recent years there has been a dramatic rise in the number 
companies being prepared to self-report their wrongdoing to the law 
enforcement authorities. In essence, the mere prospect of a conviction for 
a foreign bribery offence can in itself represent such a persuasive threat as 
to encourage commercial organisations to self-report any wrongdoing and 
seek a “deal” or settlement with prosecutors.  
The key here is the threat of debarment (also known as blacklisting or 
exclusion). This is the mechanism through which a company or individual 
is prevented from tendering for, or participating in, a project(s) for a 
specific reason, such as previous involvement in corrupt practices.40 
Debarment is now widely regarded as an important procedure for 
combating foreign bribery as it is fear of economic loss that constitutes 
such a persuasive threat that it drives the decision to self-report. Indeed an 
OECD study published in 2014 suggests that 1 in 3 foreign bribery cases 
were instigated by self-reporting by companies.41  
Here the lead is being taken by both the US via the FCPA and the 
World Bank Group. Once again, Alstom provides an excellent case study.  
 
1. Alstom and the FCPA  
 
In 2014, the DoJ announced that investigations had revealed that 
Alstom “had paid more than US$75 million [in bribes] to government 
officials in countries around the world, including Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, the Bahamas and Taiwan, to secure US$4 billion in projects with a 
                                                     
40 See further John Hatchard, “Recent Developments in Combating the Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials: A Cause for Optimism?” (2007) 85 University of 
Detroit-Mercy Law Review 1, 23-28. 
41 OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials (Paris 2014) 9. 
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profit to the company of approximately US$300 million”.42 As a result, on 
22 December 2014, Alstom pleaded guilty to charges of violating the 
FCPA by falsifying its books and records and failing to implement 
adequate internal controls.  
On 22 December 2014, Alstom issued the following brief press 
release: 
 
“Alstom S.A. has agreed to plead guilty to violating the books and 
records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA and to pay a 
fine of approximately US$772 million”. 
 
It was left to the DoJ to provide the reasons for imposing the biggest 
fine ever levied for FCPA offences. These also serve as a warning to other 
commercial organisations to take persuasive threats seriously.43 
 
1) Alstom failed to self-report: i.e. it failed voluntarily to disclose its 
misconduct. This clearly places the onus on the commercial 
organisation to take the initiative by self-reporting rather than 
adopting a “wait and see” approach as to whether their misconduct 
will be discovered. 
2) Lack of cooperation by Alstom: Alstom initially failed to cooperate 
fully with the DoJ’s investigation and this impeded the investigation 
of individuals involved in the bribery scheme.   
3) Nature and seriousness of the offence: As the Plea Agreement puts 
it: “The Defendant’s conduct spanned many years and a number of 
countries and business lines, and involved sophisticated high-level 
schemes to bribe government officials…”.44 
4) Alstom lacked an effective compliance and ethics programme at the 
time of the offence: This emphasises that simply having such a 
programme in place is not enough: commercial organisations must 
take steps to ensure that they are effective and subject to periodic 
review.  
5) Prior corporate misconduct, including debarment of its subsidiaries 
by the World Bank (see below).  
 
The Alstom Plea Agreement also includes detailed information about 
the alleged role of individual Alstom executives, employees and 
                                                     
42 DoJ Press Release, November 13 2015. 
43 The full details of the Plea Agreement of 22 December 2014 are set out in 
United States v Alstom SA Case 3:14-cr-00246-JBA.   
44 Ibid, 14. 
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“consultants” in the bribery schemes. This is significant in that attention is 
not simply focused on the organisation as a legal person, but also on those 
within it who are responsible for the wrongdoing.  
The desire on the part of Alstom to plead guilty to a non-bribery 
offence is of crucial importance. For commercial organisations, it is vital 
to avoid a bribery conviction which brings with it possible debarment 
proceedings in the US and the loss of US government contracts. Thus the 
threat of debarment and the dire economic consequences thereof, can 
“persuade” even the most powerful commercial organisations of the need 
to “reveal all” and to reach a settlement in foreign bribery cases.  
 
2. Alstom and the World Bank 
 
Much of the funding for major projects in developing countries is 
provided by the five multilateral development banks.45 In recent years, 
these institutions have paid increasing attention to combating fraud and 
corruption in the procurement process. The role of the World Bank Group 
(WBG) in this respect is particularly illustrative.46  
The WBG has a strict policy on dealing with fraud and corruption in 
relation to WBG-financed projects. Its policy on “Fraud and Corruption” 
is set out in the Procurement Guidelines47 as follows: 
 
“It is the Bank’s policy to require that Borrowers (including 
beneficiaries of Bank loans), bidders, suppliers, contractors and 
their agents (whether declared or not), sub-contractors, sub-
consultants, service providers or suppliers, and any personnel 
thereof, observe the highest standard of ethics during the 
procurement and execution of Bank-financed contracts”.48 
 
                                                     
45 The African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American 
Development Bank Group and the World Bank Group. 
46 The World Bank Group comprises five agencies: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); International Development Agency 
(IDA); International Finance Corporation (IFC); Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). The term “World Bank” generally refers to the 
IBRD and the IDA. 
47 WBG Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services 
under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers, 2011, 
updated 2014. 
48 Para 1.16. 
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A similar provision is found in the Consultants Guidelines.  
A violation of the fraud and corruption provisions of the Procurement 
Guidelines or Consultants Guidelines renders a “Respondent” (i.e. a firm 
or individual) liable to sanctions.49 Article 9 of the WBG Sanctioning 
Guidelines provides for five possible sanctions: 
a) A public letter of reprimand; 
b) Conditional non-debarment: The Respondent is required to comply 
with certain remedial, preventative or other conditions as a condition 
to avoiding debarment from WBG projects; 
c) Debarment for a fixed period; The Respondent is declared ineligible to 
tender for a WBG-funded project, either indefinitely or for a stated 
period of time; 
d) Debarment with conditional release; The Respondent is released from 
debarment if the Respondent demonstrates compliance with certain 
remedial, preventative or other conditions for release, after a 
minimum period of debarment; 
e) Restitution or Remedy: The Respondent is required to make 
restitution to the Borrower, to any other party or take action to remedy 
the harm done by its misconduct. 
 
On 9 April 2010, the five multilateral development banks together 
with the International Monetary Fund and European Investment Bank 
Group (the Participating Institutions) signed an Agreement for Mutual 
Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (the Mutual Debarment 
Agreement). Under it, each agrees to enforce debarment decisions made 
by another Participating Institution as soon as possible.50 This coordinated 
and comprehensive approach to debarment is a significant milestone as it 
provides a common framework for tackling transnational corruption and 
provides another significant persuasive threat to the economic well-being 
of commercial organisations.51  
The Alstom case neatly illustrates the debarment and cross-debarment 
process. In 2002 Alstom made an improper payment of €110,000 to an 
                                                     
49 The current listing of ineligible firms and individuals is available at 
<http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=84266&contentMD
K=64069844&menuPK=116730&pagePK=64148989&piPK=64148984> 
accessed 1 July 2016. 
50 This is subject to the criteria set out in paragraph 4 of the Agreement. 
51 For a useful discussion on the 2010 Agreement see Lorenzo Nesti, “The 2010 
‘Agreement on Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions’ and Its Impact for 
the Fight Against Fraud and Corruption in Public Procurement” (2014) 14(1) 
Journal of Public Procurement 62-95. 
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entity controlled by a former senior government official for consultancy 
services in relation to the WBG-financed Zambia Power Rehabilitation 
Project. Following Alstom’s acknowledgment of misconduct in relation to 
the project, in 2012, Alstom Hydro France and Alstom Network Schweiz 
AG (Switzerland) and their affiliates were debarred by the World Bank 
for a period of three years. As a result, they were also subject to cross-
debarment under the Mutual Debarment Agreement. This was all part of a 
negotiated resolution agreement between Alstom and the World Bank 
which also included a restitution payment by the two companies totalling 
some $9.5 million. In addition, Alstom itself and its other affiliates were 
conditionally non-debarred.52  
 
3. Strengthening corporate compliance programmes 
 
The failure of Alstom to have in place an effective anti-corruption 
compliance programme was noted in both the agreement with the World 
Bank and the Plea Agreement with the DoJ. As part of the World Bank 
settlement, the World Bank’s Integrity Compliance Office (ICO) required 
Alstom to implement a corporate compliance programme in line with the 
World Bank’s integrity compliance guidelines. An independent 
compliance monitor was appointed to oversee the process. By 2014 the 
ICO was satisfied that this had been implemented and accordingly 
Alstom’s subsidiaries were released from debarment. In an important 
illustration of cooperation and coordination, based on the ICO’s findings, 
the DoJ did not then impose a compliance monitor in the FCPA 
proceedings.   
It is regrettable, albeit perhaps not surprising, that Alstom’s UNGC 
Communications on Progress makes no reference to these events (nor 
indeed to any of Alstom’s global misconduct): thus bringing into question 
the value of such reports.   
 
PART 2: SOME LESSONS FROM THE ALSTOM CASE 
 
The Alstom case provides a number of vital lessons in the art of 
persuading commercial organisations to prevent involvement in foreign 
bribery in their business activities. This Part explores some of the key 
lessons.  
 
                                                     
52 World Bank Press Release, 22 February 2012. 
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1. Recognising the growing importance of corporate codes of ethics and 
compliance programmes 
 
On the face of it, voluntary corporate codes of ethics and compliance 
programmes appear to constitute merely “moral persuasion”. Alstom’s 
code of ethics is a case in point. Some form of code was in place during 
the period of bribe paying by the company and its subsidiaries: yet it had 
little or no impact on the way in which the company went about its global 
bribery activities. 
Today, such codes and programmes are far more significant. Thus the 
failure of Alstom to have in place an effective compliance programme 
was a factor in determining the enormous fine imposed upon it by the DoJ 
as well as influencing the terms of its negotiated settlement with the 
WBG. More generally, under the Bribery Act the existence of a code of 
ethics is an important factor in determining whether or not a commercial 
organisation has “adequate procedures” in place to prove it has a defence 
to a section 7 charge.  
In the past, such codes and programmes may well have been ignored 
by company management and shareholders. This is not the case today 
with the pressure now on commercial organisations not only to have them 
in place but to make them effective. Moral persuasion has been reinforced 
by persuasive threats. 
 
2. Controlling the activities of sales agents and other third parties 
 
As Banco et al point out, multi-national companies can face serious 
challenges when seeking to obtain or retain business in the energy sector 
in many parts of the world.53 A particular challenge is controlling the 
activities of sales agents, subsidiaries and third parties.54 This is 
emphasised in a 2015 survey by KPMG International. This found that an 
increasing number of companies were finding corporate anti-bribery and 
corruption compliance highly challenging with their overriding concern 
relating to the auditing of third parties for compliance. This was due to the 
“very high proportion of bribes now paid either by third parties to the 
                                                     
53 See Banco et al, (n 28) 152. 
54 For example, in the Sweett Group case the corrupt payments were made by its 
subsidiary company, Cyril Sweett International Limited to Khaled Al Badie, a 
senior official of AAAI to secure the award of a contract with AAAI for the 
building of the Rotana Hotel in Abu Dhabi. As noted below, such cases also help 
reveal the identities of those foreign public officials involved in the bribery 
scandal and lead to their possible prosecution. 
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ultimate recipient or to seemingly unrelated parties acting on behalf of the 
ultimate recipient”.55 This is confirmed by the OECD Working Group on 
Bribery which reported that 3 out of 4 cases analysed involved the use of 
intermediaries.56 
The pressure on commercial organisations to address the problem of 
bribery by their agents is neatly illustrated by the Alstom case. For many 
years the company had used external “sales consultants” in a number of 
countries who were compensated on a “success fee” basis.57 In 2014 the 
danger of such a practice was highlighted by the US DoJ:  
 
“In connection with the bidding on the power projects [in the 
Bahamas], … Alstom retained Consultant I [whose] primary 
purpose was not to provide legitimate consulting services to 
Alstom and its subsidiaries but instead was to pay bribes [to a 
public official] who had the ability to influence the award of 
power contracts”.58 
 
It is noteworthy that in 2014, the company announced that “in an 
effort to further reduce compliance risks to the Group and in line with 
Alstom achieving the highest ethical business standards, the company has 
decided to discontinue the hiring of such Sales Consultants”.59 Other 
commercial organisations may well need to follow suit. 
 
3. Developing the global political will to combat the bribery of foreign 
public officials 
 
Combating the bribery of public officials effectively also requires the 
political will on the part of all States to take the necessary steps to tackle 
the problem. There are still far too many states that demonstrate “no 
political will” to do so, despite their having in place legislation in 
compliance with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Here the work of 
                                                     
55 KPMG International, Anti-bribery and Corruption (n 9) 7.  
56 OECD Foreign Bribery Report (n 41) 8. 
57 Alstom Press Release, January 17 2014. 
58 See the discussion below on the fate of the Bahamian official. Similarly, in the 
case of bribes paid to obtain a power contract in Indonesia, the DoJ has noted that 
to conceal the bribes, Alstom “retained two consultants purportedly to provide 
legitimate consultation on behalf of Alstom … In reality, the primary purpose for 
hiring the consultants was to use the consultants to pay bribes to Indonesian 
officials”: DoJ Press release July 17 2014. The Press Release includes fascinating 
details about how the bribes were allegedly paid. 
59 Alstom Press Release (n 57). 
COMBATING FOREIGN BRIBERY 
 
 
128 
Transparency International and the OECD Working Group on Bribery in 
seeking to improve this situation is particularly noteworthy. 
 However, the approach of the US and the UK is encouraging. Indeed, 
the extensive jurisdiction provided for in the FCPA and BA means that 
few transnational corporations can avoid the prospect of prosecution even 
where the alleged foreign bribery offence(s) took place elsewhere.   
 
4. Prosecuting individuals within the commercial organisation  
 
It is notoriously difficult to identify those individuals within a 
commercial organisation who were involved in the bribery of foreign 
public officials. As the Yates memorandum puts it: 
 
“In large corporations, where responsibility can be diffuse and 
decisions are made at various levels, it can be difficult to 
determine if someone possessed the knowledge and criminal intent 
necessary to establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
is particularly true when determining the culpability of high-level 
executives, who may be insulated from the day-to-day activity in 
which the misconduct occurs”.60  
 
It is therefore necessary to “persuade” commercial organisations to 
disclose information about those of its officials and employees who were 
responsible for or involved in the acts of foreign bribery. If successful, 
this can provide a most powerful deterrent as it now exposes even their 
most senior officials to criminal or civil liability. In practice, the US has 
been willing to prosecute such individuals. For example, between 2012 
and 2014, four senior officials of Alstom subsidiaries pleaded guilty to 
FCPA violations in respect of the awarding of a US$118 million power 
contract in Indonesia known as the Tarahan project.61  
To emphasise this commitment, in September 2015 the US Deputy 
Attorney General, Sally Yates issued an internal DoJ memorandum (the 
Yates memo) entitled “Individual Accountability for Corporate 
Wrongdoing”.62 This states that: 
                                                     
60 See n 62 below, at 2. 
61 See Department of Justice Press release, 17 July 2014. Marubeni Corporation, 
Alstom’s consortium partner on the Tarahan project also pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and was sentenced to pay a criminal fine of 
US$88 million. 
62 The Yates memorandum is available at 
<https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download> accessed 1 July 2016 
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“One of the most effective ways to combat corporate misconduct 
is by seeking accountability from the individuals who perpetrated 
the wrongdoing. Such accountability is important for several 
reasons: it deters future illegal activity, it incentivizes changes in 
corporate behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are held 
responsible for their actions, and it promotes the public's 
confidence in our justice system”.63 
 
The Yates memo provides “Guidance” which will apply to all future 
investigations of corporate wrongdoing. It makes it clear that, amongst 
other things: 
 
(1) To be eligible for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to 
the Department [of Justice] all relevant facts about the individuals 
involved in corporate misconduct;64  
(2) Both criminal and civil corporate investigations should focus on 
individuals from the inception of the investigation;65 and 
(3) Absent extraordinary circumstances, no corporate resolution will 
provide protection from criminal or civil liability for any 
individuals.66 
 
Given the already significant financial penalties being imposed on 
commercial organisations by the DoJ, this represents a most significant 
persuasive threat that requires commercial organisations to adopt a “reveal 
all” approach. Indeed, as noted earlier, one reason for Alstom’s record 
fine was due to its failure to cooperate fully with the DoJ investigators.  
In the UK, a somewhat similar approach is being taken with the SFO 
launching a series of prosecutions against several senior Alstom company 
executives in relation to the alleged payment of bribes paid in order to 
obtain business in India, Poland and Tunisia.67  
                                                     
63 Ibid, 1 
64 Emphasis in the original. 
65 Guidance, para 2. The Yates Memo (at 2) states that the Guidance also applies 
to civil corporate matters as these “serve to redress misconduct and deter future 
wrongdoing”. 
66 Guidance, para 4. 
67 As at 1 November 2016, the cases were still ongoing. In some cases, the 
sharing of information between States is the catalyst for launching an 
investigation. For example, the SFO investigation which led to Alstom 
subsidiaries and senior company officials being charged with bribery offences in 
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Given this reality, the EY 14th Global Fraud Survey (the EY Global 
Fraud Survey) entitled Corporate Misconduct: Individual Consequences 
makes the position quite clear: 
“Boards need to be aware that regulators are enforcing anti-
corruption legislation with vigor, and are increasingly focused on 
individual misconduct. Boards must respond and confirm that they 
are doing enough to protect their business from these risks, or both 
board members and their employees may be held personally 
responsible for misconduct under their watch”.68  
 
5. Revealing the identity of the foreign public officials who benefitted 
from the bribe 
 
The “reveal all” approach demanded by self-reporting also helps to 
remove the secrecy surrounding the corrupt bargain itself and thus identify 
those foreign public officials involved in the bribery scandal. This 
provides the victim States with an opportunity to take appropriate action 
against those officials. For example, as noted earlier, Alstom pleaded 
guilty to bribery in connection with the obtaining of a contract with the 
Bahamas Electricity Corporation (BEC), a government-owned company. 
In May 2016, a court in the Bahamas convicted Fred Ramsey, a former 
board member of the BEC, of a series of bribery offences involving his 
assisting Alstom to obtain win contracts and overturn a government award 
to a competitor. It might be noted that the chief prosecution witness at the 
trial was the Alstom consultant who paid the bribes: he had been granted 
immunity in the case. 69  
 
6. Dealing with prosecutions in multiple jurisdictions  
 
The Alstom case highlights the fact that by adopting (i.e. being 
“persuaded” to adopt) the “reveal all” approach may open the company to 
                                                                                                                        
Hungary commenced as a result of information supplied by the Office of the 
Attorney General in Switzerland: SFO Press Release 12 May 2015. 
68 EY 14th Global Fraud Survey, Corporate Misconduct: Individual 
Consequences (2016) 4. The EY Survey also found that the majority of 
respondents supported the prosecution of individual executives with 83% of 
respondents viewing enforcement against management as an effective deterrent in 
combating corruption: 5.  
69 Richard L Cassim, “Bahamas Utility Official Convicted of Taking Alstom 
Bribes” FCPA blog, 5 May 2016: 
<http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/5/5/bahamas-utility-official-convicted-of-
taking-alstom-bribes.html> accessed 1 August 2016. 
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enforcement actions in multiple jurisdictions or by multiple international 
financial institutions based on the same or similar facts. 
Whilst not an “Alstom” case, the Bonny Island case provides a good 
illustration of such actions. This related to contracts for a natural gas 
project in Nigeria obtained by four foreign companies (the TSKL 
consortium) allegedly through bribery. The TSKL consortium later agreed 
a FCPA-related settlement with the DoJ and SEC and then, following an 
investigation in Nigeria, to a settlement with the Nigerian government. 
The consortium also agreed to pay penalties to the African Development 
Bank totalling US$22.7 million for bribes relating to the same contracts 
whilst an Italian court also fined one of the partner companies to the 
consortium some US$27.4 million.70 
In the Alstom case, its settlement with the US DoJ was to resolve 
charges that it paid bribes to government officials in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
the Bahamas and Taiwan. But there was no “global” settlement here. This 
raises the prospect of the company also facing prosecution (or other 
enforcement action) in these “victim” states with the prospect of 
significant additional financial penalties being imposed on it. If this is the 
case, then, without more, this can have a chilling effect on the reveal all 
approach as companies seek to avoid exposure to criminal liability on a 
global scale. 
This is a developing area which raises two further issues. 
 
a) A global settlement approach?  
 
In cases where more than one Party has jurisdiction over the foreign 
bribery offence, Article 4(3) of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
provides that “the Parties involved shall, at the request of one of them, 
consult with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for 
prosecution”. Clearly there is no obligation to consult and the provision 
only applies to Parties to the Convention. The UNCAC, which has a 
global reach,71 takes a similar approach. It provides that “States Parties 
shall consider concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements or 
arrangements in relation to matters that are subject to investigations, 
prosecution or judicial proceedings in one or more States”.72 Further that 
in such proceedings, “the competent authorities of those States Parties 
                                                     
70 For details and sources of the information see Jay Holtmeier, “Cross-Border 
Corruption Enforcement: A Case for Measured Coordination Among Multiple 
Enforcement Authorities” (2015) 84 Fordham LR 493, 498-499. 
71 As at 1 November 2016, there were 180 State Parties to the Convention. 
72 Article 49. 
COMBATING FOREIGN BRIBERY 
 
 
132 
shall, as appropriate, consult one another with a view to coordinating the 
actions”.73 
Thus, there is no obligation on States to reach a global settlement and 
the possibility remains of carbon copy prosecutions74 of, or other 
enforcement action against, the commercial organisation in multiple 
States based on the same or similar conduct.75 This is potentially of 
particular value for victim States which have an opportunity of using the 
corporate disclosure to prosecute both their own corrupt public officials as 
well as the bribe paying company.76 
The possibility remains of reducing corporate financial liability in the 
light of a monetary settlement reached in another State or of coordinated 
action between States to resolve a global bribery issue.77 However 
whether any “credit” is given by a court in response to such a settlement is 
uncertain.  
 
b) A double jeopardy issue? 
 
The double jeopardy rule was developed by the common law to 
prevent a person being tried twice for the same crime and is widely 
recognised in both national laws and international conventions. Yet the 
rule is potentially limited by the dual sovereignty principle which provides 
that two sovereign States can each prosecute a person for the violation of 
both their laws even if based on the same facts. As Colangelo asserts:  
 
“A national prosecution applying and enforcing a national law 
does not erect a bar to successive prosecutions by other States with 
national jurisdiction over the crime in question”.78 
                                                     
73 Article 42(5). 
74 A term coined in Andrew S Boutros and T Markus Frank, “‘Carbon Copy’ 
Prosecutions: A Growing Anti-Corruption Phenomenon in a Shrinking World” 
[2012] U Chicago Legal Forum 259, 260.  
75 Alstom’s plea agreement with the DoJ specifically states that it is only binding 
on the DoJ: see United States v Alstom SA 14-CR-236 (2014), para 3 (the Alstom 
settlement). 
76 An excellent example of this is provided by the Lesotho Highlands Water case: 
see Hatchard, Combating Corruption (n 10) 245 et seq. 
77 For example, in the Siemens case, the company entered into a coordinated 
settlement with both the DoJ and German authorities. For a useful discussion on 
this area see Holtmeier (n 70) 508-511. 
78 Anthony J Colangelo, “Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A 
Jurisdictional Theory” (2009) 86 Washington University Law Review 769, 797. 
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For example, in a case involving a Siemens employee, the defendant 
sought to have a corruption charge dismissed in an Argentinian court on 
the basis that he had previously been prosecuted for the same offence in 
Germany. The court refused to dismiss the case ruling that the German 
court had focused on the private effects of the alleged bribery whilst the 
Argentina case involved potential harm to the public sector.79 As 
Holtmeier comments: 
 
“Thus, as conceived, the double jeopardy principle is narrow 
enough that if courts and enforcement agencies can find some way 
to distinguish the separate proceedings, and show they are not 
identical, it will rarely be a bar to prosecution”.80 
 
7. Civil action by unsuccessful rival bidders 
 
The “reveal all” requirement may also leave commercial organisations 
open to the prospect of civil actions being brought against them by 
unsuccessful bidders for contracts which were won through bribery.81 For 
example, at the trial of Fred Ramsey in the Bahamas, the Alstom agent 
responsible for the payment of the bribes testified that these were paid in 
return, amongst other things, for Mr Ramsey asking a Cabinet minister to 
intervene to overturn a unanimous decision of the BEC to award the 
contract to a South Korean company, Han Jung.82 In such circumstances, 
there seems little to prevent Han Jung bringing civil proceedings against 
Alstom.   
 
8. Encouraging whistleblowing 
 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has noted 
that there is extensive research to demonstrate that information provided 
                                                                                                                        
Emphasis in the original. The article provides a detailed examination of the issue: 
see especially 790-805. 
79 This information is drawn from Lucio Fabiani Larranga. “Double Jeopardy? 
Siemens Defendant Loses Argentina Dismissal Motion”: see further 
<http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/7/21/double-jeopardy-siemens-defendant-
loses-argentina-dismissal.html> accessed 1 July 2016. 
80 Ibid, 515. Emphasis in the original.  
81 See, for example, the South African case of Transnet Ltd v Sechaba Photoscan 
(Pty) Ltd [2004] ZASCA 24 and discussed in Hatchard, Combating Corruption (n 
10) 258-259. 
82 See Holtmeier (n 70) 498. 
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by whistleblowers is one of the most common ways in which instances of 
fraud and corruption are identified.83 It is therefore not surprising that the 
international community is taking active steps to encourage both 
whistleblowing and the provision of effective protection for those who do 
so.84 
Given this reality, the possibility of whistleblowers revealing 
corporate wrongdoing is increasingly a threat to commercial 
organisations. The potential impact of whistleblowing is neatly illustrated 
by the HSBC Bank case in which Hervé Falciani leaked financial 
documents showing illegal activities by the Swiss arm of the bank.85 The 
release of the Panama Papers in 2016 even more starkly highlights the 
possibility of the “super-whistleblower” who is capable of obtaining vast 
quantities of data with potentially explosive exposure of nefarious 
corporate wrongdoing. Indeed, commercial organisations can also expect 
to be exposed to new risks of data loss through cyber attacks.86 
There is seemingly no mention of Alstom in either of the leaks. 
However, the threat of exposure of corporate wrongdoing by 
whistleblowers, either voluntarily or by way of a plea bargain (or through 
cyber attacks), and its potential economic impact on any commercial 
organisation is another potentially significant persuasive threat to 
encourage good corporate governance.87  
 
 
 
                                                     
83 UNODC, The United Nations Convention against Corruption: Resource Guide 
on Good Practices in the Protection of Reporting Persons (UNODC 2015) 3. 
This publication contains an excellent bibliography on the wealth of resource 
material available on this topic. 
84 See, for example, the Council of Europe, Recommendation on the Protection of 
Whistleblowers (Committee of Ministers Recommendation to Member States 
CM/Rec(2014)7). For the purposes of the Recommendation, a whistleblower 
means “any person who reports or discloses information on a threat or harm to the 
public interest in the context of their work-based relationship, whether it be in the 
public or private sector”: Appendix. 
85 For his trouble, in 2015 Falciani was convicted by a Swiss court of offences 
relating to his action and sentenced to five years imprisonment. 
86 See the EY Global Fraud Survey (n 68) 41. 
87 For example, in June 2016, both Alstom and GE were named by a 
whistleblower as being involved in the Petrobras bribery case. The information 
was provided by way of a plea bargain. Both denied any involvement in the case 
but Alstom’s shares fell 2.7% on the news: Bloomberg News, 7 June, 2016.   
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9. Requiring enhanced scrutiny of commercial organisations subject to 
mergers or acquisitions 
 
Commercial organisations are now under pressure to perform 
enhanced due diligence when involved in mergers and acquisitions. This, 
in itself, can raise concerns about possible misconduct on the part of the 
other party which can delay or even undermine the proposed deal. For 
example, at the time of the DoJ investigation into its activities, Alstom 
was in the process of seeking to sell its energy business to the giant 
American firm GE for around US$15 billion. This was put on hold until 
the deal by Alstom with the US Department of Justice paved the way for 
the sale to proceed. Even then Alstom was not permitted to pay the 
US$772 million fine from the proceeds of the merger. 
According to the EY Global Fraud Survey, despite record levels of 
mergers and acquisitions: “… respondents are not yet taking potential 
steps to identify and mitigate key corruption risks before entering into 
joint ventures or local partnerships”.88 Clearly there is still progress to be 
made here.   
 
PART 3: CONCLUSION: THE ART OF PERSUASION 
REVISITED 
 
This article has explored the challenge of persuading commercial 
organisations whether they want to or not, to  
 
(1) Take effective steps to prevent the bribery of foreign public 
officials in their business activities (the prevention strategy); and  
(2) Reveal everything about any past involvement in such bribery (the 
reveal all strategy). 
 
Using the case of Alstom, it has highlighted that there are a range of 
persuasive techniques that can meet this challenge.  
As regards the prevention strategy, the moral persuasion approach i.e. 
persuading commercial organisations to publicly commit to corporate 
good governance through putting in place codes of ethics and compliance 
programmes, may seem of limited value. As TI points out, at worst such 
programmes are “mere window dressing” exercises. Certainly, in the light 
of its diverse foreign bribery activities, Alstom’s claim to be an “ethical 
company” has a somewhat hollow ring.  
                                                     
88 EY Global Fraud Survey (n 68) 25. 
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Yet today, the development of corporate codes of conduct and 
compliance programmes goes beyond moral persuasion and mere window 
dressing. There is now real pressure on all commercial organisations to 
take steps to maintain a “rigorous anti-corruption compliance programme 
that includes policies and procedures designed to detect and deter 
violations” of anti-bribery laws. The “gentle persuasion” standard-setting 
initiatives of the UNGC, the OECD and TI provide an excellent basis for 
the development and maintenance of such programmes. This will be 
enhanced if the Communications on Progress required under the UNGC 
are used to encourage, and help monitor transparency on, progress in this 
regard. With the moral persuasion and gentle persuasion strategies now 
being reinforced by persuasive threats, the hope is that commercial 
organisations will indeed take the necessary steps to prevent the bribery of 
foreign public officials in their business activities.  
As regards the “reveal all” strategy, a combination of forceful 
persuasion and persuasive threats led to Alstom eventually disclosing its 
global bribery activities. However the impact of the forceful persuasion 
strategy remains limited by the reluctance of many Parties to the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention to prosecute cases of alleged foreign bribery. 
The failure of France to take any action against Alstom, a company that 
has its headquarters in that country, epitomises the point. The active 
enforcement of the Convention by all Parties is now essential and this will 
not only act as an important deterrent but should also facilitate the 
development of more effective multi-jurisdictional coordination in 
combating foreign bribery, including encouraging and facilitating a 
“global settlement” approach.89  
Yet as the Alstom case highlights, it is the threat of a conviction for a 
foreign bribery offence and subsequent debarment that played the key role 
in persuading it to reveal all and to agree settlements with the World Bank 
and the US DoJ. In the US context, the Yates Memo now becomes highly 
significant. By making eligibility for a settlement dependent upon the 
commercial organisation providing the DoJ with “all the relevant facts 
about the individuals involved in corporate misconduct”, it enhances the 
prospect of making accountable those responsible for the authorising 
                                                     
89 It is noteworthy that on November 8 2016, France adopted anti-corruption 
legislation (known as “Sapin 2”) which allows magistrates to enter into deferred 
prosecution agreements with companies with the maximum fine being 30% of the 
company’s annual turnover. To ensure transparency, the agreement requires the 
approval of a judge at a public hearing: see <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
france-corruption-idUSKBN1332G1?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews> 
accessed 9 November 2016. 
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and/or undertaking the illegal activity as well as those in the highest 
echelons of the organisation who turn a “blind eye” to corporate 
wrongdoing. It also acts as an important deterrent on any future illegal 
activity and provides a further incentive for senior officials of commercial 
organisations to ensure that their compliance programmes are effectively 
implemented. This approach should be adopted elsewhere.  
The Yates memo has drawn some criticism. One commentator 
describes it as “rhetoric because the reality is that few DOJ corporate 
enforcement actions result in any related charges against company 
employees.90 However only time will tell whether this is the case. What is 
important is that the policy is in place. As Yates herself has noted “Our 
goal is to get to the bottom of who did what and if there are culpable 
individuals, hold them accountable… Our goal is to uncover the truth”.91    
These are exciting times. Just a few years ago, the idea that 
commercial organisations, including even the largest multinationals, could 
be persuaded to take effective steps to prevent foreign bribery in their 
operations, whether they wanted to or not, would have seemed highly 
unlikely. This article has demonstrated that through the Art of Persuasion, 
corporate conduct can be changed for the better. This is still work in 
progress92 but hopefully it will contribute to the enhancement of good 
governance and transparent management in the energy sector 
                                                     
90 See FCPA Professor blog <http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-yates-memo/> 
accessed 1 September 2016. It is further asserted in the blog that between “2008-
2014, 75% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions have not (at least yet) resulted 
in any DOJ charges against company employees” (emphasis in the original). 
91 Speech given by Sally Q Yates at the New York City Bar Association White 
Collar Crime Conference, (May 17 2016) 5.  
92 For example, the results of the EY 14th Global Fraud Survey show that “a 
significant minority of global executives [are] willing to justify unethical 
conduct” with the Report concluding that “individuals, including some senior 
executives entrusted with the guardianship of their firms, cannot be assumed to 
act with integrity if the end might seem to justify the means”: see (n 69) 20 and 
41. 
